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COMPLICITY 
 
 
 
James G. Stewart* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Complicity is responsibility for helping. This essay provides a 
comparative overview of the criminal law and theory pertaining to 
complicity. Instead of taking a strong prescriptive position on the best way 
to construct accomplice liability, it charts a series of recurrent normative 
problems in this area and points to various solutions these problems have 
generated in practice. The essay begins by considering structural 
questions that inform the shape accomplice liability is given in different 
criminal systems, then discusses the conduct required to establish 
accomplice liability, before plotting the various static and dynamic mental 
elements that are frequently allocated to the concept. Overall, the essay 
suggests that a comparative approach is very helpful in shedding light on 
blind spots in various schools of thought about complicity, including 
whether it deserves an autonomous existence separate from perpetration. I 
conclude that the subject deserves our ongoing intellectual engagement, 
since it goes to the heart of our attempts to live decently, in this our very 
imperfect world. 
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“[s]urveying complicity's hazy theoretical landscape can, depending on 
the commentator's nerve, temperament, and resilience, induce feelings 
running from hand-rubbing relish to hand-on-the-brow gloom.” 
 
K.J.M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity.1 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Complicity is responsibility for helping. If I am planning to rob a 
bank, my chances of succeeding are appreciably increased if I enlist others 
to assist me. A division of labor enables me to take the cash from the bank 
vault, while a partner in crime detains the manager at gunpoint. Thus, 
from a consequentialist perspective, the criminal law should punish my 
assistants too, in order to deter would-be helpers who lower barriers to 
criminal offending.2 Likewise, on a deontological basis, accomplices share 
responsibility for the crimes they assist. If we are accountable for the 
harms we bring into the world, focusing on just the individual who makes 
the final contribution to the realization of a criminal offense overlooks the 
often important, sometimes decisive, difference accomplices make to 
criminal endeavors and, on occasion, their solidarity with the perpetrator. 
Accomplices deserve punishment to rebalance the moral ledger, express 
disapprobation in ways that shore up the community’s common 
condemnation of prohibited conduct, or to respect their own dignity. 
And yet, crafting standards of complicity that achieve these ends 
poses a set of beautiful conceptual problems. Perhaps most fundamentally, 
my confederate in the bank heist did not steal anything—I am the only one 
who takes property from the bank. This might not be an especially vexing 
problem if the wording of the criminal offense did not require “taking 
property”, which only I did; or if accomplice liability did not make my 
assistant responsible for one and the same crime. But to borrow John 
Gardner’s metaphor (which draws on murder not robbery), as far as 
complicity goes, it is as if the accomplice pulled the trigger herself.3 Of 
course, she often did not. But why the qualifier “often”? Now the real 
                                                
1 K. J. M. SMITH, A MODERN TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COMPLICITY 4 (1991). 
2 GABRIEL HALLEVY, THE MATRIX OF DERIVATIVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 33 (2012).  
3 John Gardner, “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Procure”: An English View of Complicity, in 
EINZELVERANTWORTUNG UND MITVERANTWORTUNG IM STRAFRECHT, 228 (Albin Eser, 
Barbara Huber, & Karin Cornils eds. 1998). 
2013] COMPLICITY 4 
   
complexity begins; perhaps my confederate’s role was so dominant in the 
criminal enterprise that she is the real perpetrator, and I her accomplice. 
Alternatively again, might we say that there are no accomplices here at all, 
since we jointly designed and executed the robbery in concert? Complicity 
is helping, but what does that mean? 
In what follows, I offer an overview of the various answers to 
these questions. Throughout, I draw on comparative criminal law and 
theory, which proves helpful in exposing blind spots in the various schools 
of thought about accomplice liability. For instance, most Anglo-American 
scholarship on complicity assumes that I am inevitably the perpetrator in 
my hypothetical, and that my colleague’s responsibility is to be assesses 
using complicity, regardless of whether he is the real perpetrator, a co-
perpetrator or a more peripheral aid. German criminal theory, on the other 
hand, is not wedded to the idea that my colleague is an accomplice, 
although the analytical tools it develops to make that determination are 
sometimes more sophisticated than satisfying, and assume the need to 
distinguish between perpetrators and accomplices at all. In what follows, I 
explore and take issue with both approaches.  
A disclaimer at the outset. Of necessity, I am unable to traverse an 
extensive terrain in this high altitude survey, so I have elected to limit my 
attention to the paradigm case of complicity: aiding and abetting. Thus, 
assume in my burglary scenario that I am able to convince a bank clerk to 
provide me with the code to the vault ahead of time in exchange for a cut 
of my takings at the bank. This clerk was not at the bank when the robbery 
took place, played no part in the planning and has no ongoing relationship 
with me; she merely saved me the time, expense and inconvenience of 
using explosives to open the safe. The question is, under what conditions 
can we hold her responsible for the armed robbery she assists? As we will 
see, the interweaving pathways we must tread to answer this question are 
elaborate, the conceptual terrain often treacherous, and where you end up 
very much depends on where you begin.  
 
II. PRELIMINARY STRUCTURAL ISSUES 
 
So much of the content of complicity is contingent on core structural 
commitments, but too often, we rush into the intriguing controversies 
without having fully contemplated these core questions. In this section, I 
sketch the bare bones of four preliminary controversies, in preparation for 
the short journey through the labyrinth of accomplice liability that awaits.  
2013] COMPLICITY 5 
   
A. Complicity and Perpetration 
 
There is a latent defect in the foundations of Anglo-American 
complicity theory. English speaking scholars assume that the accomplice 
is always the person who assisted the physical perpetrator, and that the 
perpetrator was whoever personally performed the requisite verb in the 
crime’s definition (i.e. “taking” in burglary). Only part of that assumption 
is sound—complicity is the remainder of responsibility by participation 
left over once perpetration is subtracted. Thus, as Carl Erik Herlitz 
explains, the problem of defining complicity is broadly analogous to 
defining “night”; if you can adequately define “day” the project takes care 
of itself.4 For complicity too, the meaning we attach to it is inexorably 
bound up in our definition of perpetration, which requires brief treatment 
by way of introduction. But at the risk of spoiling the plot, the idea that 
the accomplice never does the "taking" warps understandings of 
complicity.  
German criminal theorists call the assumption that the accomplice is 
whoever helps without satisfying the definition of the crime the  
“objective theory of perpetration.”5 On this theory, the perpetrator is 
someone who actually pulled the trigger, meaning that the individual 
wielding the weapon creates the object to which complicity attaches. The 
question becomes, who assisted the person with the gun? And yet, this 
view of the perpetration/complicity binary was abandoned in much of 
Europe in the first half of the 19th century, when theorists like Feuerbach 
exposed its hidden flaw.6 In cases where an actor pulling the trigger was 
merely an innocent proxy for a puppet master in the background, it 
seemed perverse to call the mastermind a mere accomplice when she was 
really the prime mover in the whole criminal affair. The puppet master did 
not satisfy the definition of the crime, and yet it was her undertaking. 
Therefore, the objective theory of perpetration failed to single out the real 
accomplice. 
Instead, Continental theorists attempted to develop an integrated 
concept of complicity that was sensitive to a revised notion of perpetration 
(as compared with common lawyers, who were content to retain the 
                                                
4 CARL ERIK HERLITZ, PARTIES TO A CRIME AND THE NOTION OF A COMPLICITY OBJECT: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ALTERNATIVES PROVIDED BY THE MODEL PENAL CODE, 
SWEDISH LAW AND CLAUS ROXIN 40–41 (1992). 
5 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 654–655 (1978); Neha Jain, 
Individual Responsibility for Mass Atrocity: In Search of a Concept of Perpetration, 61 
AM. J. COMP. L. 831–871 (2013). 
6 Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, Problems of Justification and Excuse in the Setting of 
Accessorial Conduct, 1986 BYU L. REV. 611, 613–614 (1986). 
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objective theory and treat innocent agency as a category apart). The initial 
step away from the objective theory of perpetration, saw the rise of a 
subjective alternative—a perpetrator became someone who takes the 
crime “to be his own,” and by implication, an accomplice is a person who 
takes herself to be assisting “the act of another.”7 In time, this turn to the 
subjective also fell out of favor. The reasons were myriad, but the 
possibility that no one might think of themselves as playing the lead role 
in a joint crime was chief among them. In the place of the subjective 
theory, a mixed objective/subjective test gained ascendancy based on an 
assessment of who has hegemony or control over the criminal act.8  
Whatever the merit of these contrasting theories of perpetration, 
they highlight a point of monumental significance for the journey to 
come—Anglo-Americans’ theory of complicity is built on shaky ground. 
In particular, the idea that “all actors whose conduct does not satisfy the 
definition of the offense are accessories” is conceptually unsafe.9 This 
insight has major implications for the contours we give to complicity. If 
we cannot tell automatically whether the standards we are discussing 
attach to the mafia boss, the foot soldier in the prison camp or the 
businessperson selling weapons, we should proceed with great caution that 
our intuitions about one category do not spill over into an entirely 
different scenario. Bald intuitions that overlook this point are sometimes 
damaging. 
B. Mode of Participation, Inchoate Offence or Separate Crime  
 
Complicity can be located in one of a number of places. 
Traditionally, it functions as a form of participation, meaning that it 
allocates responsibility to the accomplice for the perpetrator’s 
consummated offence. According to this orthodox understanding, 
complicity is a device within the general part of the criminal code that 
matches the helper’s agency with the crimes they assist. It is precisely this 
participation-type structure that creates many of the wonderful conceptual 
difficulties we later explore, from the verbal inconsistency between the 
requirements of the crime and the actions of the accomplice (the latter is 
held responsible for murder even though she did not personally “kill” 
                                                
7 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 655. 
8 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 655; Schreiber, supra note 6, at 626; HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS 
PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 30–33 (2009). 
9 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 655. 
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anyone) to perceived difficulties with causation between accomplice and 
completed offence.  
The second option is to make complicity an inchoate offence 
comparable to attempt. This model enjoys some powerful support. For 
Christopher Kutz, for example, the quintessence of complicity lies in the 
risk-enhancing character of the accomplice’s act, meaning that the only 
real inquiry is whether the accomplice’s actions were “of the type to make 
a difference.”10 We return to these ideas in some depth momentarily, but 
at this juncture, observe how many leading scholars join Kutz in arguing 
that complicity is best reconstructed as a form of inchoate liability,11 in 
sharp contrast with the manner in which it functions as a matter of 
doctrine in most jurisdictions presently. On this inchoate account, the 
concept is transformed into culpable conduct that increases the risk of 
criminal harm, regardless of whether or not that harm occurs—the bank 
clerk is responsible for burglary, even if I do not use the code she 
supplied. 
 The third option treats complicit as a separate offence. In a number 
of jurisdictions, lawmakers have enacted a separate crime that no longer 
couples with other offences like burglary, effectively relocating 
accomplice liability from the general to the special part of the criminal 
code. On this vision of complicity, the bank clerk who provided the code 
for the safe would be convicted of a separate crime called “criminal 
facilitation”, not burglary. While these facilitation offenses are 
increasingly common,12 they invariably complement rather than replace 
traditional participation-type notions of complicity. In a subsequent 
section, we assess the merit of this approach in greater detail. For now, 
note simply how there are credible reasons for situating complicity among 
forms of participation, inchoate offences and the special part of the 
                                                
10 Christopher Kutz, The Philosophical Foundations of Complicity Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW, 5–6 (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 
2011); See also Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 289–305 
(2007). 
11 See also Daniel Yeager, Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity, 15 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS 25 (1996). 
12 For discussions of these new statutes in US jurisdictions and in England, see 
respectively, Robert Weisberg, Reappraising Complicity, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 217–281, 
261–270 (2000) (note that some of the facilitation statutes discussed are not inchoate, in 
that they require the crime facilitated to have occurred); ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (6 ed. 2009) (discussing three genuinely inchoate offences 
passes as part of the Serious Crime Act 2007 in England and Wales. The new crimes are 
labelled “Encouraging and Assisting Crime,” and do not require that the crime is 
consummated.)  
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criminal code, and that all models are reflected in extant doctrine 
somewhere in the world.13 
C. Between Unitary and Differentiated Models 
 
The next preliminary issue is existential—why have complicity at all 
when a broader notion of perpetration can envelop it? Put differently, is it 
really important that forms of responsibility mark the type and degree of 
participation, or could we just condense them into a single concept that 
ensures uniform standards? Thus, in addition to those arguments for 
uprooting then replanting complicity in different parts of the criminal code 
(forms of participation, inchoate offences, or special part), we must also 
consider whether we should not just remove complicity to the sentencing 
phase. According to advocates for what German theorists call the unitary 
theory of perpetration (“Einheitstäterschaft”), this option has a range of 
philosophical advantages.14 These arguments have great consequences for 
the content of complicity to which we turn subsequently, so warrant brief 
introduction here. 
The unitary theory of perpetration comes in three varieties, although 
some might contest whether the third species really fits within the genus.15 
The first, known as a pure unitary theory, treats a causal contribution to a 
crime coupled with the requisite blameworthy moral choice as necessary 
and sufficient elements of responsibility (excuses and justifications aside). 
On this view, complicity is stripped of any autonomous existence outside 
a capacious notion of perpetration. So, instead of attempting to 
manufacture fine-tuned rules that define complicity in such and such a 
manner, a unitary theory of perpetration places it and all other modes of 
participation in a big pot, then boils them all down to their shared essence. 
Through this distillation, blame attribution involves deciding whether 
                                                
13 Of these options, inchoate versions of complicity are the rarest, but they do exist. See 
Jørn Vestergaard, Criminal Participation in Danish Law - Uniformity Unlimited?, in 
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY IN TRANSITION FINISH AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 475–
490 (Raimo Lahti & Kimmo Nuotio eds., 1992). 
14 I have advocated for the unitary theory of perpetration in international criminal law. 
See James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 
LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 165–219 (2012); For arguably the leading text in Germany, see 
THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT TATHERRSCHAFT: ZUR ABKEHR VON 
EINEM DIFFERENZIERENDEN BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIV-
FUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE (1st ed. 2009). For an overview of countries that adopt 
the unitary theory, see JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 121, 133 (2e ed. 2002). 
15 Wolfgang Schöberl, Die Einheitstäterschaft als europäisches Modell: die 
strafrechtliche Beteiligungsregelung in Österreich und den nordischen Ländern, 2006. 
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accused X is responsible for crime Y based on settled core principles that 
pay no regard to the form participation takes, leaving their moral 
significance to be assessed post hoc by judges at the sentencing phase of a 
trial.  
The second variant provides more detail, without compromising the 
unitary theory's core commitments.16 The pure unitary theory has faced a 
barrage of criticism from differentialists, who object that cramming forms 
of participation into a single vessel does not forewarn would-be criminals 
of their exposure to potentially serious criminal responsibility, thereby 
violating the principle of legality. To address this concern, a number of 
states adopt a watered down unitary concept—called a functional unitary 
theory of perpetration—that at least articulates the different forms of 
causal connections that might apply within a unitary framework: 
responsibility might involve carrying out the offence personally, 
instructing others to do so, providing necessary assistance, or assistance 
that is readily available elsewhere. On either the pure or functional unitary 
theories, however, complicity is just like perpetration not attempt. 
Third, some argue that subjecting accomplices to the same range of 
punishment as perpetrators also constitutes a weak type of unitary theory. 
In Germany (and the many jurisdictions that follow its example), aiders 
and abettors are sentenced to a maximum of three quarters of the penalty 
for the offense they facilitate, whereas the sentence for instigators is taken 
from the same sentencing range as principals.17 To a large extent, this 
discrepancy in maximum sentence drives the need for differentiating 
between perpetrators and accomplices, even if “[r]emarkably little effort is 
spent on justifying this differentiation”.18 Nonetheless, this approach 
generates a tendency to look upon systems that formally equate sentencing 
ranges for perpetrators and accomplices (in France and England, for 
example),19 as soft iterations of the unitary theory. If this third variant is 
accurately described as unitary, it places no restriction on the substantive 
                                                
16 DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, DER EINHEITSTÄTER IM STRAFRECHT 22 (1971) (explaining 
how a very formal notion of the unitary theory was displaced by a more functional or 
material view of unitary perpetratorship). 
17 Strafgesetzbuch, § 26, 27 and 49. For a modern English translation, see MICHAEL 
BOHLANDER, THE GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE: A MODERN ENGLISH TRANSLATION 43, 50 
(2008). 
18 Markus D. Dubber, Criminalizing Complicity: A Comparative Analysis, 5 J INT 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 977–1001, 984 (2007). For attempts to justify the distinction based on 
the perpetrator’s “important criminal energy”, see CLAUS ROXIN, STRAFRECHT, 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL. BD. 2: BESONDERE ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN DER STRAFTAT 231 (1. 
A. ed. 2003). 
19 The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c.98), s. 8 (emphasis added) 
(stating that the accomplice “shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a 
principal offender.”) 
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elements of accomplice liability of complicity, whereas other unitary 
theories do.       
 
D. Complicity and Justifications 
 
Oftentimes, the core elements of accomplice liability are forced to 
accommodate anxieties about the guilt or innocence of would-be 
accomplices, when these anxieties are better processed elsewhere in a 
tripartite structure of crime. The justification of necessity is a prime 
example. How is it that necessity might ease some of the normative load 
complicity is frequently asked to shoulder, allowing for a more principled 
election from the various models identified above? Might it be that where 
we position complicity in the architecture of criminal justice and the 
model we employ to achieve our objectives also requires an appreciation 
of justifications? In what follows, I draw on an important English case that 
bears this point out, highlighting a background issue that we return to 
when we come to debates about the mental element required for 
complicity.   
In a famous English case called Gillick, a group of doctors sold 
contraceptives to underage patients in a bid to prevent teenaged 
pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.20 By implication, however, 
these doctors were also knowingly facilitating sexual intercourse among 
juveniles, making the doctors complicit in statutory rape. Although the 
issue arose in a civil not criminal trial, the House of Lords used the 
occasion to further the longstanding contest between purpose and 
knowledge as mental elements for complicity (subjects we return to in 
some detail further below). But as leading British commentators suggest, 
the better approach was to consider this scenario as an instance of 
necessity,21 rather then allowing intuitions about guilt or innocence to 
corrupt the contours of complicity itself. How is this approach 
advantageous? 
By allowing necessity to function together with mental elements for 
complicity lower than purpose, we arguably create a model that is better 
calibrated to moral nuance. On the one hand, this combination avoids 
creating a safe harbor for indifferent assistants, who deliberately help 
sometimes massive criminal wrongs without desiring their occurrence in a 
strong volitional sense. Think of the suppliers of the chemical asphyxiant 
                                                
20 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112. 
21 DAVID C. ORMEROD, SMITH & HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 102–103 (12th ed. 2008); 
ASHWORTH, supra note,12 at 418. 
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Zyklon B to the S.S. for use at Auschwitz,22 who would quickly point to 
their commitment to profit maximization as the true purpose of their 
supply. Surely this is inadequate, especially when indifference suffices for 
the perpetration of the crime with which they are charged. On the other 
hand, the necessity/complicity combination exonerates assistance that 
simultaneously promotes a set of laudable values that outweigh the harm 
inflicted.23 Whatever the case, the availability of justifications has major 
ramifications for the definition we assign complicity. 
 
III. THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF COMPLICITY 
 
In order to guard against thought-crimes, guilt by association or 
punishment based on status, a wrongful act calibrated to the definition of 
the crime is widely regarded as “a primary candidate for a universal 
principle of criminal liability.”24 But what action is required of the 
accomplice, particularly when someone else will frequently (but not 
invariably) complete the crime? In the abstract, the best we can say is that 
the accomplice assists, but once we move to concretize what this means, a 
range of thorny questions arise that have generated contradictory 
approaches in theory and doctrine. As we will see, these debates go to the 
heart of questions about where to situate complicity within the criminal 
law and touch on all the contextual issues we traversed in the previous 
section.  
A. Practical Assistance and Moral Encouragement 
 
The conduct required from complicity can involve actions or 
omissions, practical assistance or moral encouragement. In other words, 
the assistance that might constitute complicity is not limited by type. In 
some systems, criminal legislation provides certain illustrations, chief 
among which is “providing the means,” but these references are never 
exhaustive of the forms help might take. After all, how could one catalog 
                                                
22 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others “The 
Zyklon B Case,” 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93. 
23  For helpful discussions of the relationship, see Douglas N. Husak, Justifications and 
the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491 (1989); 
Schreiber, supra note 6.  
24 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 420; But see Douglas N. Husak, The Alleged Act 
Requirement in Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW (John Deigh & David Dolinko eds., 2011). 
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all types of assistance without creating loopholes for the imaginative? The 
conduct element of accomplice liability must therefore be open-ended, 
meaning that a whole raft of behaviors can assist crimes, ranging from 
providing weapons to driving getaway cars and cheering from the 
peripheries. In part, the perilous path the theory of complicity must travel 
stems from this breadth, especially when the accomplice’s conduct is 
“otherwise innocent.”25  
According to Christopher Kutz, this characteristic of complicity 
produces a stark asymmetry—any type of conduct can constitute 
complicity but perpetration is circumscribed. “The principal’s actions are 
only a basis for liability if they satisfy the relatively constraining 
templates of substantive criminal law: they are burnings or batterings or 
killings or rapings or robbings, or attempts thereof. By contrast, virtually 
any kind of act, speech or otherwise, can satisfy the act requirement of 
accomplice liability, for virtually anything one person does can be a form 
of assistance or encouragement to the other.”26 While this reflection is 
insightful, we should also temper the sense that the asymmetry is unique 
to complicity; that view presupposes the objective theory of perpetration 
but other (more popular) alternatives reveal that all forms of participation 
can sometimes involve this breadth. As we saw earlier, accomplices might 
be those doing the batterings and killings perpetrators mastermind.  
Moral encouragement can also constitute assistance. If I yell support 
to a stranger who is about to kill a common enemy, am I responsible for 
the murder that follows? Most jurisdictions rightly answer in the 
affirmative, but the hypothetical brings delicate problems in causation to 
the fore. Assuming that assistance must affect the realization of the crime, 
how do we establish that the encouragement made a difference to the 
perpetrator’s decision to carry out the offence? Worse, what if the 
perpetrator never heard my enthusiastic encouragements, meaning that I 
positively desired, endorsed and supported the criminal wrongdoing, 
without contributing to it? Is a psychological disposition coupled with 
some action upon it sufficient for accomplice liability, or have we fallen 
down the precipice into the realm of thought crimes we feared at the 
outset?  
Omissions can form the basis for accomplice liability too, where 
would-be accomplices labor under a legal obligation to act. If I rob a bank 
and a policeman stationed just outside decides not to apprehend me in 
order to help, he is potentially an accomplice, despite having done quite 
literally nothing. Of course, there is something of a fiction in the equation 
                                                
25 Glanville Williams, Complicity, Purpose and the Draft Code - 2, CRIMINAL LAW 
REVIEW 98, 101 (1990). 
26 Kutz, supra note 10, at 294. 
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omission + duty = action, but that white lie is not particular to 
complicity27, and therefore, it offers no analytical leverage in the contest 
between the various models of accessorial liability. In fact, given the 
structural congruity of commission and complicity, one wonders with 
Michael Moore why accomplice liability is not subsumed within generic 
principles of attribution.28 This reasoning suggests one of the stronger 
versions of the unitary theory of perpetration, where complicity and 
perpetration are symmetrical, mirroring one another with perfection. At 
the same time, the argument is also vulnerable to the litany of criticisms 
differentialists offer against condensing responsibility into a single 
concept. 
B. The Nature and Extent of Derivative Liability 
 
The term “derivative liability” is frequently used to describe 
accomplice liability, but it is less frequently defined. What precisely is this 
derivative liability, and if we embrace it, are we safely fenced off against a 
collapse into vicarious liability, a.k.a. guilt by association? For Sanford 
Kadish, vicarious liability is (illiberal) punishment based only on a 
relationship between the parties, whereas derivative liability requires an 
action and blameworthy choice on the part of the secondary party, apt to 
“make it appropriate to blame him for what the primary actor does.”29 But 
here too, the different models I presented earlier furnish a set of 
alternative understandings, which frequently pass under the radar in 
accounts that neglect comparative theory. Complicity can certainly 
embrace derivative liability with varying degrees of intensity, but it can 
also discard the derivative structure altogether.30 In what follows, I expand 
on several of these possibilities. 
How could complicity without derivative liability work? Could we 
really deny that complicity is responsibility “for what the primary actor 
does”, reimagining the concept as responsibility for one’s own actions 
(including their causal imprint occasioned through others)? True, few 
                                                
27 Marcelo Ferrante, Causation in Criminal Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIMINAL LAW 
REVIEW 470–497 (2008); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN 
ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009). 
28 Michael S Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 395 (2007). 
29 Sanford H Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 337 (1985). 
30 Poland offers an example of complicity without derivative liability in existing doctrine. 
See Stanisław Frankowski, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW , 355 
(Adam Bodnar & Stanislaw Frankowski eds., 2005). 
2013] COMPLICITY 14 
   
countenance this conceptual possibility, assuming it is axiomatic that 
complicity must take derivative form. For instance, George Fletcher 
defines accessorial liability as “all those who are held derivatively liable 
for another’s committing the offense,”31 without entertaining alternative 
possibilities. On this account, one is compelled to manufacture an act and 
choice that adequately bridge the distance between an accomplice’s 
agency and the perpetrator’s wrongdoing (for which the accomplice is 
blamed), conscious all the while of the short distance to vicarious liability 
and other evils.  
Needless to say, this engineering produces important downstream 
consequences. Most strikingly, the derivative nature of complicity dictates 
that even the most nefarious would-be accessory, who does everything in 
her power to facilitate someone else’s crime, is complicit in nothing if a 
perpetrator does not act wrongfully. No crime, no complicity. So, if X 
sends a crowbar to her friend Y in prison in order for Y to use it to break 
out of prison, there is nothing to be responsible for if Y dies before ever 
receiving the crowbar. This, once again, draws us back into the competing 
models of complicity we witnessed to begin, especially arguments that 
complicity should be reinvented as a form of inchoate liability. Why 
should the accomplice escape justice if her actions and moral choice are 
identical whether the crime is consummated or not, but by a matter of pure 
chance, the perpetrator does not act as she imagined? 
 To at least minimize this apparent absurdity, observe the gradual 
diminution of derivative liability historically. Initially, derivative liability 
was so intense that the accomplice would escape prosecution if the 
principal perpetrator was never apprehended, prosecuted and convicted.32 
In England it was only in 1848 that it became possible to indict, try, 
convict and punish an accessory before the fact “in all respects as if he 
were a principal felon”,33 regardless of whether the perpetrator was first 
brought to trial and convicted. Around the same time, Continental systems 
made a similar shift, which reduced the principal’s perpetration of the 
crime to a contested issue within the accessory’s trial. With these changes, 
the formal reliance on derivative liability within complicity became less 
intense, although it still remained a central feature of the doctrine.  
 Recently, the intensity of derivative liability has continued to 
dissipate. In most modern national jurisdictions, an accomplice can now 
be held responsible where the principal perpetrator’s crime is excused, say 
when an accomplice assists someone insane to commit a crime. As a 
                                                
31 FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 637. 
32 Dubber, supra note 18, at 982; Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the 
Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 695 (1929) 
33 Sayre, supra note 32, at 695. 
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result, most contemporary notions of complicity entail only a “limited or 
partially derivative character” (“limitierte Akzessorietat”).34 Although the 
moral basis for this dilution is plain enough (why excuse an accomplice if 
the perpetrator dies, disappears or is insane?), it also gives rise to 
normative complications. How do we determine the responsibility of 
someone who gives you a gun intending that you kill W, but fortuitously, 
W attacks you first and you kill him with the gun in self-defense? Perhaps 
the derivative component of complicity should erode completely, making 
the person who provides the weapon responsible for murder even though 
you are not? 
 This brings us back to the unitary theory of perpetration, which 
seems to affirm this normative position. According to a number of 
commentators, the unitary theory successfully unshackles itself from the 
binds of derivative liability, by asserting that “each causal contributor to 
the crime is individually liable for his own conduct.”35 Some even argue 
that “the central point of contention between unitarian and differentiated 
systems in regard to the criminal liability of accessories can thus be found 
in the question whether the liability of the accessory is derived from the 
wrong committed by the perpetrator, or whether it is autonomous.”36 So, 
instead of conceiving of a single murder as containing a discrete quantum 
of wrongdoing to be distributed between perpetrators and accomplices, a 
unitary theory posits as many murders as there are participants, even 
though they all involve the same dead body. 
 To be clear, these positions are certainly open to dispute. Why 
must the unitary theory do without the derivative structure anyway? Could 
it not be possible for a pure or functional unitary theory to harmonize 
objective and subjective elements for all types of participation in a crime, 
but still allow a partial derivation from the perpetrator in cases such as 
these? Most fundamentally, is it fair to convict the person who supplies 
me with a weapon I use to defend myself of murder, just because he 
wanted the deceased dead? If these and other related questions require 
greater attention in the theory of accomplice liability, they at least caution 
against overly categorical avowals that complicity is responsibility for 
someone else’s offence or rushes to inchoate liability to deal with perverse 
results born of the derivative structure. As is frequently the case with 
complicity, any one problem has a variety of plausible solutions that 
heavily depend on prior commitments.  
                                                
34 Schreiber, supra note 6, at 620. 
35 ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 783 (2002). 
36 JOHANNES KEILER, “ACTUS REUS” AND PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 
159 (2013). 
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C. The Causation Quandary  
 
Causation is one of the central dilemmas in accomplice liability. The 
positions on whether an accomplice’s conduct must make a causal 
contribution to a completed crime are so highly disputed in theory and 
practice that the issue probably acts as a pivot for the different ways of 
constructing accessorial liability set out earlier. One could write tomes on 
this issue alone, so I content myself in merely setting out core parameters 
of the debate(s) in broad strokes. As will become apparent, the initial 
tension pits those who view the perpetrator’s voluntary human acts as an 
intervening cause that impedes the passage of causal power from 
accomplice through perpetrator to crime, but it also involves misgivings 
about situations where there are multiple sufficient causes for a single 
event.  I deal with both in turn, highlighting a selection of issues that arise 
under the umbrella of each debate. 
Following the seminal work of H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré on 
causation, most English-speaking commentators have argued that the 
volitional actions required to convict the direct perpetrator preclude the 
claim that the accomplice too caused the harm.37 The perpetrator made a 
genuine decision; this interrupts all earlier causal influence, and acts as an 
intervening cause. On this account, the accomplice’s actions are no more 
the cause of a crime than the perpetrator’s genes, family history and socio-
economic background, all of which undoubtedly provide influence, 
without overriding the perpetrator’s blameworthy moral choice.38 As a 
consequence, various accounts of complicity emerged that attempted to 
sooth the cognitive dissonance created by treating complicity as a mode of 
participation, when participation could not be established by the usual 
metrics.39 
While Hart and Honoré’s masterpiece captivated Anglo-American 
views of the topic for several decades, there is much that now points in the 
opposite direction. First, instigation offers a clear counterpoint—if X pays 
a hitman to assassinate his wife, we have little trouble in declaring that 
both X and the hitman caused the wife’s death.40 Moreover, German 
understandings of cause, effect and agency all deny voluntary human 
                                                
37 H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 129 (2 ed. 1985). 
38 Kadish, supra note 29, at 333. 
39  Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense, 5 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 427 (2007). 
40 Moore, supra note 28, at 422-423. In fairness to Hart and Honoré, they viewed 
instigation as an exception to their general rule that voluntary action breaks causal 
chains, but as Joel Feinberg retorts “they put forward no more general principle to 
explain why the exceptions are exceptions.” JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 153 (2nd 
Printing, ed. 1987). 
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actions the ability to annihilate the enduring causal influence of the 
accomplice’s act,41 a position that coincides with Michael Moore’s more 
recent scholarship, which searched high and low for a metaphysical 
justification for the notion of intervening causes, coming up empty 
handed.42 In all of these instances, we have grounds for thinking that 
causation matters for complicity if it matters for criminal responsibility at 
all. 
Indeed, an argument from the debate about whether causation 
matters for responsibility generally works for complicity, too. In this 
regard, Michael Moore draws on Susan Wolf—we would be appalled by 
someone who treated negligent driving that killed an infant as merely a 
question of poor driving, in the same way that we would view someone 
who blamed themselves for killing an infant when they merely drove 
negligently as psychically imbalanced.43 By extrapolation to complicity, 
when we try business representatives as accomplices in atrocity for selling 
asphyxiants to Auschwitz, we are not just concerned about their 
associations with the Nazis; we mean to single out a particular type of 
conduct and its unspeakable causal impact. Associating with the wicked is 
one thing, but offering a substantial causal contribution to a mass killing is 
altogether qualitatively different. Causation tracks this distinction. 
If this reasoning is sound, it sheds new light on the shortcomings of 
treating complicity as a separate offence. To return to Auschwitz, a 
separate offence approach to accomplice liability would convict the 
suppliers of Zyklon B of criminal facilitation—not murder, extermination 
or genocide.44 This alternative may overcome evidential difficulties 
associated with proving complicity or anxieties about its possible 
overreach, but it also gravely understates guilt to convict the vendors of 
the chemical used to gas in excess of four million people of a crime 
labeled “criminal facilitation.” As I have argued elsewhere, the label of a 
crime is a key feature of the punishment inflicted upon a criminal, and 
accomplices are no exception.45 Therefore, even if one thinks that a new 
                                                
41 See, for instance, WOLFGANG JOECKS, in: Wolfgang Joecks, Klaus Miebach and Bernd 
von Heintschel-Heinegg (ed.), Münchener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch. Band 1 §§ 
1-51 StGB, 2003, § 27, marginal numbers 23-37. French understandings of causation in 
complicity are similar. See Philippe Salvage, Le Lien de Causalité en Matière de 
Complicité, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ 25–42 
(1981). 
42 MOORE, supra note 27, Chapter IV.  
43 Citing S. Wolf, 'The Moral of Moral Luck', in C. Calhoun ed. Setting The Moral 
Compass Essays By Women Philosophers  6 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
44 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 93. 
45 Elsewhere, I argue that the principle of fair labeling frequently deserves no separate 
existence from culpability. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 176; On fair labeling, see 
2013] COMPLICITY 18 
   
separate offence of complicity complements the more traditional 
participatory model nicely, when the crime (here genocide) does take 
place and the accomplice’s actions make an unequivocal contribution to it 
(here providing the means), convicting the accomplice of “criminal 
facilitation” seriously miscommunicates responsibility for what really 
transpired. 
What of overdetermined forms of complicity? In many instances, an 
accomplice provides assistance that makes no discernible difference to the 
occurrence of criminal harm, since the assistance provided was not 
essential to the crime’s realization.46 If the Nazis had access to a long line 
of willing suppliers of chemical asphyxiants, it would be difficult to argue 
that the suppliers of Zyklon B really caused the terrible ends to which 
their chemicals were put. As one of the defendants claimed, had he not 
agreed to supply the chemicals to Auschwitz, “the S.S. would certainly 
have achieved their aims by other means.”47 So if causation means “but 
for” causation then even if this firm did not furnish the S.S. with the 
means of exterminating humans en masse, the horror of Auschwitz would 
still have unfolded almost identically. Thus, many argue that complicity 
cannot require a causal connection between assistance and completed 
crime, leading us back into the case for alternative models. 
This dilemma also leads to at least one important strategy for side-
stepping the problem without reinventing complicity as a concept. Sanford 
Kadish, for instance, argued that we need a new notion for measuring the 
“success” of an accomplice’s help, given two key features of the concept. 
First, assistance that has absolutely no impact on the crime is not culpable, 
say when I send a crowbar to a friend in prison in the hope he can use it to 
break out, but it arrives after the friend scales the prison wall (derivative 
liability). Second, accomplices frequently make no discernable difference 
at all, yet we insist on their responsibility (overdetermination). In 
response, Kadish suggests that the core question should be whether the 
accomplice’s help “could have contributed to the criminal action of the 
principal.”48  
This thesis fails on two scores. First, raising the risk of an event will 
not suffice for causation if in fact the risk is not realized. The vendors of 
Zyklon B undoubtedly “could have contributed” to the Holocaust by 
supplying asphyxiants, but if we modulate the facts somewhat such that at 
                                                                                                                     
James Chalmers & Fiona Leverick, Fair Labelling in Criminal Law, 71 MODERN LAW 
REVIEW 217–246 (2008). 
46 James G. Stewart, Overdetermined Atrocities, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1189–1218 
(2012). 
47 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 116, at 102. 
48 Kadish, supra note 29, at 359. 
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the last minute all prisoners at Auschwitz were shot not gassed, it is 
undeniable that the company directors of Tesch & Stabenow did not play a 
causal role in the deaths that actually transpired.49 If causation matters to 
responsibility, risk raising itself will not do. Second, overdetermined 
causes are universally considered a species of causation, even if 
philosophical justifications for that view are surprisingly difficult to come 
by.50 Excluding overdetermined causes would not only eviscerate a large 
portion of complicity, it would also lead to intensely counterintuitive 
results for perpetration—no one could ever cause murder. Everyone 
eventually dies, so the serial killer merely modifies the time, place and 
manner of an inevitability. If these modifications matter for perpetrators, 
should they not for accomplices too? 
D. Substantial and De Minimis Contributions	  
 
For many, the causal contribution an accomplice makes to an 
offence must be “substantial” in order to implicate her in the 
consummated crime. By insisting on substantial contributions, we erect a 
threshold that excludes de minimis assistance, viz. conduct that had little 
more than a trivial impact of the crime’s occurrence. To cite a neat and 
often-used example, consider the responsibility of a serial murderer’s 
grandmother—but for her decision to procreate the better part of a century 
earlier, the murder of numerous innocents would never have transpired at 
the hands of her progeny.51 But by including the grandmother in the pool 
of agents responsible for these crimes, we extend accomplice liability 
beyond the point of plausibility, to an extreme where it chills normal 
social interaction and undermines liberal values. While this is agreed 
theoretically,52 the boundaries of substantial contributions remain ill 
defined and contested.  
Consider the reference to “substantial contributions” in the 
negotiations of the American Model Penal Code. As is well known, these 
negotiations were dominated by an acute anxiety about the relationship 
                                                
49 MOORE, supra note 27, at 284. 
50 See Stewart, supra note 14; See also, John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. 
LAW AND PHILOS. 127–141, 138-140 (2007) (arguing that overdetermined accomplices 
still make causal contributions to the 'overall incidence' of criminal harm, and that it is no 
justification to have 'subtracted' the alternative cause that would have caused the harm 
had the particular accomplice desisted). 
51 J. Stapleton, 'Perspectives on Causation,' in Jeremy Horder ed., Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 67. 
52 For a discussion of the metaphysics of “substantial” causes, see Stewart, supra note 46, 
at 1207. 
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between complicity and commerce. One aspect of the reasoning is 
especially germane here—when reflecting on the objective element of 
complicity, commentators to the MPC reasoned that “[a] vendor who 
supplies materials readily available upon the market arguably does not 
make a substantial contribution to commission of the crime since the 
materials could have been gotten as easily elsewhere.”53 Unfortunately, 
this explanation is less than satisfying, and speaks to the troubles created 
by leaving “substantial” undefined. What is so problematic about this 
explanation?  
If assistance is only ever substantial if it is not readily available, the 
rule excludes all overdetermined contributions from complicity. But this 
reading of “substantial” would swallow the better part of complicity. If 
soldier A acts as a lookout while his colleagues rape women in a prison, is 
he really exonerated because another solider in his platoon would certainly 
have filled his shoes had he defected? Surely not. As we saw earlier, 
overdetermined forms of assistance make up a core component of any 
defensible theory of accomplice liability, and excluding them from the 
scope of the doctrine is unthinkable. In practice, for instance, many 
criminal codes take it upon themselves to explicitly state that non-
necessary forms of assistance still amount to complicity,54 such is their 
commitment to punishing forms of help that were sufficient but not 
necessary. In short, overdetermined contributions must still be substantial, 
otherwise the test cannibalizes an unacceptably large part of the concept.  
We are left then, reluctantly agreeing with Joachim Vogel, who after 
surveying much of the voluminous literature arguing for one model of 
criminal attribution over another, concludes that “[t]here is a clear and 
present danger that real and really important questions are neglected. For 
instance, a real problem is to define the “minimum threshold” of 
participation and responsibility.”55 In other words, for all the energy 
expended debating unitary versus differentiated models of attribution and 
the tests for differentiating different forms of participation, the lower 
reaches of complicity remain under-theorized, in a world where 
globalization facilities criminal offending at ever increasing rates. If 
                                                
53 LAW AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Part 1, §§ 1.01 to 2.13 MODEL PENAL CODE AND 
COMMENTARIES 318 (1985). 
54 For thirteen examples from South America, for instance, see JUAN BUSTOS RAMIREZ & 
MANUEL VALENZUELA BEJAS, LE SYSTEME PENAL DES PAYS DE L’AMERIQUE LATINE: 
AVEC REFERENCE AU CODE PENAL TYPE LATINO-AMERICAIN 128–130 (1983) (setting out 
examples of complicity rules that formally distinguish essential from non-essential forms 
of assistance). 
55 Joachim Vogel, How to Determine Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic 
Contexts: Twelve Models, CAHIERS DE DÉFENSE SOCIALE 151–69, 160 (2002). 
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accomplice liability is to be principled and not arbitrary, that situation is 
inadequate.  
 
IV. THE SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF COMPLICITY 
 
If there is anything approaching universal agreement in criminal 
theory, it might be that only the guilty should be punished. Punishment 
without culpability is anathema to liberal notions of criminal law, even if 
it does promote deterrence or other desirable utilitarian outcomes. This 
insight requires that an individual make a blameworthy moral choice that 
is perfectly calibrated to the meaning of the offence with which she is 
convicted. But what type of choice will suffice to blame the accomplice 
for “what the primary actor does,” if indeed this is the point of reference? 
In what follows, I rehearse competing solutions to this question, offering 
reflections on their comparative strengths and weaknesses. I consider the 
three dominant tests, bearing in mind that the unitary theory of 
perpetration will employ them all depending on the mental element in the 
crime with which the accomplice is charged.  
A. Purpose 
 
The American Model Penal Code requires that the accomplice helps 
with “the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence.”56 
Although the International Criminal Court and one or two other systems 
emulate this language, purpose is a serious outlier in comparative terms. 
As we noted earlier, a unitary theory of perpetration would require the 
accomplice to have whatever mental element was required of a 
perpetrator, which would mean a dynamic not static standard. Further 
below, I set out how most other Anglo-American jurisdictions adopt 
knowledge as the relevant mental element for complicity (although this 
frequently, if not invariably, dilutes into recklessness in practice). Finally, 
the majority of criminal systems inspired by the civil law tradition allow 
dolus eventualis, an even lower standard, to suffice for complicity. The 
Model Penal Code, however, facially requires “purpose,” and many have 
interpreted this as bravely forging a new path that requires an accomplice 
to positively desire the criminal outcome her assistance helps bring into 
the world.  
                                                
56 See Model Penal Code Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 
2.06(4), 296 (emphasis added). 
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At the outset, let me suggest that this whole vision of the MPC is 
misguided. As I pointed out earlier, experts who participated in the 
negotiating of the MPC were most concerned about one thing: business. 
They worried that adopting knowledge as a mental element for complicity 
would embroil otherwise legitimate businesses in too many criminal 
offenses they had no personal stake in. Sure, I know you will use these 
weapons to commit a crime, but it is no concern to me whether that crime 
occurs or not, and to borrow from Glanville Williams’ memorable 
objection, “[t]he law of complicity makes me my brother's keeper, but not 
to the extent of requiring me to enquire whether he is engaging (or 
proposing to engage) in iniquity, when my own conduct (apart from the 
law of complicity) is innocent.”57 Accordingly, the experts settled on 
“purpose,” presumably out of a desire to carve out a safe harbor for 
business. 
And yet, it is far from clear whether they achieved their goal. While 
the MPC certainly begins by stating that “[a] person is an accomplice… if 
with the purpose of facilitating the commission of the offence,” it goes on 
to insist that “[w]hen causing a particular result is an element of an 
offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice 
in the commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if 
any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the 
offense.”58 For leading American scholars and the vast majority of state 
jurisdictions in America, this means that the purpose requirement goes 
only to the provision of the assistance (my purpose was to give you the 
weapon), leaving the mental element in the crime with which the 
accomplice is charged to determine the culpability requisite for the 
attendant consequences my actions caused (if I was reckless about 
consequences, I am complicit if recklessness is sufficient for the crime in 
question).59  
Thus, the concept of complicity in the MPC is actually startlingly 
similar to the unitary theories of perpetration. Notice, for example, how 
the second component of complicity’s definition in the MPC is dynamic in 
tenor, requiring parity between the mental element for accomplice and that 
                                                
57 Williams, supra note 25, at 101. 
58 See Model Penal Code Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 
2.06(4), 296 (emphasis added). 
59 Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: 
The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681–762, 266 (1983) (discussing 
the negotiating history of the MPC that supports this interpretation). As a matter of 
doctrine, John Decker’s comprehensive survey shows that only 3 of 50 state criminal 
systems in the United States adopts a strong purpose standard. See John F Decker, The 
Mental State Requirement for Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S. C. 
L. REV. 237 (2008). 
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for perpetrator. As I detailed earlier, this desire for equivalence of mental 
elements between accomplice and perpetrator is a hallmark of unitary 
theories of perpetration, which deny the need for the forms of participation 
differentialists hold dear (even while they struggle in vain to reach 
agreement on quite how to draw said distinctions). By no small 
coincidence, the authors of the MPC shared the skepticism about the 
differentialists’ program, denying complicity any autonomous 
significance.60 Surprisingly, then, the MPC actually enshrines a functional 
unitary theory of perpetration. 
But for the sake of analytical completeness, let us consider 
“purpose” as requiring a volitional commitment to the completed crime, 
that I will call the strongest form of purpose. According to the MPC, the 
term “purpose” denotes conduct that is undertaken with the “conscious 
object” of bringing about the criminal result.61 The point of delineation 
with knowledge is fine, but “conscious object” undeniably implies a 
stronger volitional disposition. As Jeroen Blomsma surmises of purpose 
(in a slightly different context), “[t]he result is the reason for his conduct; 
it is what matters to the actor. As a consequence, it is characterized by the 
sense of having failed when the result is not achieved.”62 Thus, desires for 
profit often preclude application of this standard of complicity in 
commercial contexts, although at least conceptually, nothing prevents a 
corporate officer from wanting to simultaneously make a handsome profit 
from sales to Auschwitz and to destroy Jews. 
One point of clarification about purpose is necessary. In a helpful 
illustration, Antony Duff explains how one frequently does something 
purposefully, without actually wanting it in a strong sense. He describes 
scenarios where you reluctantly pay back a debt you have incurred or 
undergo a painful operation to cure an illness, wanting the end but not the 
means. Your purpose is still to have the painful operation and pay the 
debt.63 Thus, I still satisfy the purpose standard by helping someone to kill 
their partner in order to take a share of insurance monies, whereas I do not 
                                                
60 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 53, at 299 (stating that, according to the section 
on complicity in the MPC, “[a]s in the states that have abolished the common law 
distinctions between principals and accessories, it would suffice under this draft to charge 
commission of the substantive crime. It seems unnecessary, however, in framing an 
entire system to declare that the offender is a ”principal“; such language has meaning 
only because of the special background of the common law and it has been abandoned in 
most recent legislative reforms.”). 
61 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 53, at 2.02(2)(1). 
62 JEROEN BLOMSMA, MENS REA AND DEFENCES IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW 66 
(2012). 
63 R. ANTONY DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTIONS) 53–54 (1990). 
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if I help that same person to burn down their house in order to collect 
insurance monies we will share, even if I know that the wife will definitely 
perish in the fire.64 If the wife lives in the former scenario, my plans are 
thwarted; not so in the latter. Failure is therefore a helpful test for purpose 
in complicity (assuming purpose goes to the completed offence, which it 
does not as a matter of doctrine). 
So, should accomplice liability turn on this distinction? While the 
strongest form of purpose is sometimes celebrated as a laudable liberal 
adjustment to normal principles,65 we should reflect momentarily on its 
implications—by this doctrine an accomplice who acts in such a way that 
she not only satisfies the mental element of the crime but makes an 
essential and unjustifiable contribution to its realization is absolved of 
liability. The danger is that this “elevation theory” gives an almost 
unattainable height to the subjective element of complicity, misapplying 
desert and mis-communicating responsibility. From a retributive 
perspective, helping the partner kill her wife for insurance money when 
her death is virtual certainty is perfectly sufficient for a version of murder 
that only requires intent, so why require more? By demanding that the 
accomplice show a purpose when a perpetrator need not, “purpose” 
arguably over-corrects. 
A utilitarian view of complicity generates the same result. Since 
deterrence (and therefore crime prevention) is maximized by punishing 
those who are aware of even the slightest risk of harm, purpose is 
unattractive from a utilitarian perspective.66 Admittedly here, there are 
more complicated questions about over-deterrence, which require a 
careful calibration of complicity standards with the desire for free social 
intercourse. Nonetheless, utilitarian concerns tend to militate against 
adoption of the highest conceivable notion of blameworthy moral choice 
(i.e., purpose) across the entire panoply of crimes, since complicity can 
achieve greater deterrence for criminal harms by setting the mental 
element at levels much closer to that defined in a crime. In short, the 
strongest form of purpose under-deters accomplices by doing too little to 
offset the strong incentives for offenders to enlist assistants in the 
execution of their criminal plans. 
                                                
64 I take the example from Jeroen Blomsma, modifying it slightly to emphasize 
complicity. BLOMSMA, supra note 62, at 74. 
65 The drafters of the US Model Penal Code concluded that the purpose standard was the 
preferable mental element for accessorial liability in order to offset the indirect nature of 
the accomplice’s contribution to the criminal harm. See Model Penal Code 
Commentaries (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985), § 2.06, 318-319. 
66 I.H. Dennis, The Mental Element for Accessories, in CRIMINAL LAW: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF JC SMITH , 60 (Peter Smith ed., 1987). 
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Moreover, empirical research suggests that in many instances 
members of the public believe that the accomplice is blameworthy even 
though they did not share the perpetrator’s criminal purpose. The subjects 
of one survey reported “stark disagreement” with the “elevation thesis” 
(viz. the idea that the mental element in complicity should be elevated to 
purpose, that is, beyond that required within the paradigm of the crime 
itself).67 Instead, respondents assigned punishments to accomplices “who 
are knowing or even only reckless with respect to the criminal outcome in 
instances in which the elevation view would assign no liability.”68 While 
one cannot assume that these sentiments are invariable attributes of 
complicity everywhere, the study at least serves as further grounds for 
caution about adopting the strongest form of purpose—using this elevated 
standard as the mental element for complicity may fail to match law with 
popular notions of justice. Perhaps this explains why almost no 
jurisdiction adopts it in practice.69  
B. Knowledge 
 
In the earlier example about helping someone burn down a house to 
collect insurance money, we concluded that the strongest version of the 
purpose standard of accomplice liability would not extend liability to 
virtually certain side-effects of the accomplice’s true objective. If burning 
the house down would almost definitely kill the partner’s wife, the 
strongest purpose standard exonerates the accomplice of murder (even 
though the perpetrator is guilty of that crime). Knowledge, the second 
major mental element for complicity, assigns these virtually certain side-
effects to the accomplice too, when the strongest form of purpose would 
not. Put differently, knowledge diminishes the volitional commitment the 
muscular version of purpose insists upon in favor of a purely cognitive 
test. The result is, a static mental standard for complicity within a 
differentiated system, that applies without regard to the mental elements 
required in the different sorts of criminal offences it partners with. 
To begin, note the comparative rationale for the purpose and 
knowledge tests for complicity. If the “purpose” standard is understood in 
                                                
67 PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN M DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 103 (1996). 
68 Id. at 103. 
69 Israel, for example, is one of the very few states that use purpose as a mental element 
for complicity. Nonetheless, like the MPC and the vast majority of states in America, it 
interprets it as implying a unitary theory of perpetration. See Itzhak Kugler, Israel, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 352 – 392, 370 (Kevin Jon Heller & 
Markus Dubber eds.,). 
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its strongest sense (which, at the risk of laboring the point, it almost never 
is in practice), purpose is said to promote autonomy by precluding 
criminal impediments to otherwise lawful activities that depend on social 
cohesion, whereas “knowledge” promotes social control and the 
prevention of crime by demanding that agents take interventionist action 
when aware that their actions are enabling offending.70 In its most (overly) 
ambitious guise, the knowledge standard posits that the potential aider 
“might be an educative or moralizing force that causes the would-be 
offender to change his mind.”71 To some extent, the Anglo-American 
systems of criminal law that adopt either knowledge or purpose as 
standards for complicity align themselves along these communitarian or 
individualistic axes. Knowledge promotes community; a strong notion of 
purpose is libertarian. 
So, how does this knowledge standard work? The first challenge lies 
in ascertaining just what knowledge attaches to—knowledge of what? 
That question is not as straightforward as it might seem, particularly when 
the offense itself fails to offer terribly much guidance. So as soon as one 
utters the word knowledge, a whole series of deeply complicated, highly 
debated and ultimately inconsistent responses arise,72 born of “uncertainty 
as to whether the law should be concerned with [the] mental state relating 
to [the accomplice’s] own acts of assistance or encouragement, to his 
awareness of the principal’s mental state, to the fault requirements for the 
substantive offense involved, or some combination of the above.”73 But 
for present purposes, let us assume that knowledge goes to the 
consummated crime the accomplice’s assistance helps produce, accepting 
that this is mostly an over-simplification for convenience.  
Knowledge presents epistemic troubles. How can someone know 
the future? Even if member X of a terrorist organization provides her 
colleague Y with a nuclear warhead for a specific terrorist mission, X 
cannot know with certainty that a crime will transpire. Short of knowing 
that water will flow downhill or that the sun will rise in the East, no one 
can know with certainty what the future will involve, and surely few 
human actions ever acquire a degree of predictability anywhere close to 
                                                
70 Louis Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American 
Criminal Law - Knowledge or Intent, 51 MISS. L.J. 155, 178 (1980). 
71 Id. 
72 Weisberg, supra note 12, at 233 (exploring different interpretations of these three 
elements); Grace E Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
2169, 2174 (1987), (arguing that, because of these multiple points of inquiry, confusion 
has existed concerning the mens rea element of accomplice liability for years). 
73 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 540 (2nd ed. 2010). 
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the direction of the Earth’s rotation or laws of physics.74 The obvious 
solution is to think of knowledge as implying appreciation of a virtually 
certain probability (akin to indirect intent), but as soon as a degree of 
probability becomes the touchstone, the temptation to surreptitiously slide 
into recklessness can prove irresistible.  
This danger is most acute where a would-be accomplice provides 
forms of assistance that can enable a wide range of crimes. Take the 
classic English case of R v Bainbridge,75 where the defendant bought 
oxygen-cutting equipment for an individual named Shakeshaft, who later 
used it to break into a bank. Bainbridge indicated that he suspected that 
Shakeshaft would use it for something illegal, but he did not know what 
precisely this illegality would involve. The English House of Lords held 
that it was essential to prove that the accomplice knew the type of crime 
the perpetrator would commit; knowledge of mere criminal propensities 
was inadequate. Conversely, if Bainbridge knew that burglary was likely 
to occur with his assistance, he needn’t know that it would involve a bank, 
the bank’s location, the proprietors of the bank, or the time of 
perpetration.76  
Before we begin to discuss this finding, note that it conforms to 
interpretations of knowledge in a number of other jurisdictions. In systems 
as diverse as France, England, Germany and the United States, 
comparable rules do similar work,77 suggesting that knowledge of the type 
of offence might be sufficient for most understandings of complicity. But 
does this go too far? As Andrew Ashworth laments, this position 
“introduces reckless knowledge as sufficient.”78 So perhaps knowledge 
never meant knowledge at all. Still, if I throw a grenade at a car knowing 
of a virtual certainty that there is someone inside the vehicle, it does not 
matter whether there is a lone three month-old girl from New Zealand, 
four elderly Japanese men, or a dozen pregnant Eskimos. If awareness of a 
                                                
74 Stephen Shute, Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: 
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 171, 186-187 (Stephen Shute & A. P. Simester eds., 
2002). 
75 R v. Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129, [1959] 3 All ER 200, CCA. 
76 ORMEROD, supra note 21, at 203. 
77 See, for instance, LaFave, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 550-552 
(discussing the “natural and probable consequence” rule in various American 
jurisdictions, which is very similar to that adopted in international criminal justice); 
JACQUES-HENRI ROBERT, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL 350 (6e éd. 2005) (setting out how an 
accomplice’s acts are unlawful if the crime actually committed injures the same legal 
interest as that the accomplice considered). 
78 Ashworth, supra note 12, at 419 (pointing out that “the accomplice knows that one or 
more of a group of offences is virtually certain to be committed, which means that in 
relation to the one(s) actually committed, there was knowledge only of a risk that it 
would be committed - and that amounts to recklessness.”). 
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virtual certainty of causing a human death is sufficient for murder, this is 
all the specificity needed for perpetration. Why would complicity be any 
different?  
The major concern, however, is that knowledge is a fixed 
requirement when the mental elements in crimes for which it assigns 
blame are not. Knowledge may suffice for complicity, but what happens 
when the crime in question requires a specific purpose?79 Intriguingly, the 
knowledge standard in complicity tends to overpower stronger mental 
elements in these crimes—in many jurisdictions, knowledge suffices for 
conviction of crimes of ulterior intent, allowing the weaker complicity 
standard to eviscerate the stronger character of the crime it joins with. In 
David and Goliath fashion, the weaker mental element for complicity 
slays the stronger counterpart in the crime. This makes for good biblical 
narrative, but it is less clear whether the story ends well for theories of 
complicity. By merely requiring knowledge as a necessary mental state for 
conviction, accomplice liability risks distorting responsibility, as distinct 
form attributing wrongdoing in line with the moral weight of the crime in 
question. A unitary theory corrects for this problem, but arguably ushers 
in problems of its own. 
C. Recklessness/Dolus Eventualis 
 
Unsurprisingly, recklessness is by far the most interesting and 
controversial standard for complicity. Can I really be responsible for the 
crime someone else commits, by conducting myself in ways that are 
“otherwise lawful,” when I merely run a risk that the offence will occur? 
Is this not deeply illiberal, given the asymmetries Kutz points to between 
perpetrator and accomplice? In many jurisdictions the answer is a curt no: 
a concept vaguely analogous to recklessness suffices to make the 
accomplice responsible for the completed offence she assists in the many 
systems that employ dolus eventualis as the lowest form of intention; in 
countries that adopt a unitary theory of perpetration, recklessness suffices 
for complicity when it is adequate for perpetration; and if one follows 
Ashworth, many (maybe all) systems that formally require knowledge 
really demand recklessness. In what follows, I critically review 
recklessness as a standard for complicity, treating the term as a vague 
equivalent of dolus eventualis.      
                                                
79 For relevant discussions, see Jeremy Horder, Crimes of Ulterior Intent, in HARM AND 
CULPABILITY 153–172 (A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith eds., 1996); Whitley R. P. 
Kaufman, Motive, Intention, and Morality in the Criminal Law, 28 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REVIEW 317–335 (2003). 
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 For one group of commentators, recklessness is at least 
refreshingly honest about its function—it avoids complicity being 
rendered “a dead letter”.80 The argument again hinges on the inability to 
know the future with certainty. To return to my earlier example, even if 
member X of a criminal gang provides her terrorist colleague Y with a 
nuclear warhead for a specific terrorist mission, X cannot know with 
certainty that a crime will transpire. Thus, argue the recklessness 
advocates, we either deny that complicity exists for assistance in advance 
of the crime (because people can seldom know in a strong sense what 
others will do in the future) or we apply a standard closer to recklessness 
for accomplices who choose to undertake acts they know are inherently 
risky (providing nuclear weapons to terrorists).81 In all likelihood, this 
reasoning probably explains why knowledge dilutes to recklessness so 
frequently in practice. 
But is reckless complicity is a bridge too far? Embracing reckless 
complicity would require us to continuously vet those with whom we have 
dealings so that we can ensure that our interactions do not lead to 
potentially serious criminal harm. This, according to many scholars, 
would have the unsavory consequence of creating “blank cheque 
responsibility”,82 where the aider becomes responsible for all foreseeable 
consequences of their daily public interactions.83 Beyond unduly 
infringing upon liberty and individual autonomy, a reckless standard of 
complicity would offend liberal notions of punishment and inhibit social 
intercourse.84 Especially in a world where we depend on markets to 
“stabilize the pursuit of individual conceptions of the good despite 
widespread moral disagreement”,85 inhibiting risky behavior by otherwise 
innocent third parties arguably goes too far. 
But is this always the case? Notice how the critics of recklessness 
seldom mention desert, even though the notion acts as a corner piece of 
any defensible theory of criminal responsibility. To conform with desert, 
recklessness should be appropriate as a standard of liability for the 
accomplice when it is adequate for the perpetrator. The argument 
conveniently dovetails with claims that using recklessness as a standard 
for complicity where recklessness suffices for the crime in question would 
not imperil an individual’s autonomy or chill normal social interchange 
                                                
80 BRENT FISSE & COLIN HOWARD, HOWARD’S CRIMINAL LAW 332 (5th ed. 1990). 
81 Fisse and Howard, supra note 80, at 332. 
82 Smith, supra note 1, at 13. 
83 Williams, supra note 25, at 101. 
84 Sanford H Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 383 
(1996). 
85 CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 168 
(2000). 
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any more than reckless perpetration already does.86 Consequently, there 
may be no generic difficulty to instances of reckless complicity as such; it 
is really the application of recklessness across crimes whose mental 
elements are more onerous that is unduly harsh. This qualified defense of 
reckless complicity becomes stronger still if this account of complicity is 
understood in conjunction with necessity as a justification. The result, of 
course, again recalls the unitary theory of perpetration, which pairs the 
mental element for complicity to that set out in the crime. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION	  
 
 
This short essay highlights just some of the features of accomplice 
liability, in ways that reveal both the “hand-rubbing relish” and “hand-on-
the-brow gloom” promised in the epigraph. Alas, there is so much that has 
had to go unaddressed. The essay leaves out, for instance, the doubtful 
arguments by many leading theorists that the accomplice liability of 
vendors approximates to omission liability, because the vendor is required 
to depart from their “ordinary course of business.”87 Likewise, it makes no 
mention of the substantial body of literature governing so-called “neutral 
acts” (“neutrale Handlungen”),88 but in a forthcoming work, I disagree 
with the view in a portion of this literature that “typical,” “ordinary” or 
“commonplace” actions are excluded from the scope of accomplice 
liability.89 And finally, space has not allowed discussion of what Sanford 
                                                
86 Kadish, supra note 84, at 387 (“It is not evident to me that subjecting actors in these 
circumstances to liability for a crime of recklessness need greatly imperil the security of 
otherwise lawful activities, certainly not any more than holding actors liable for 
recklessly ‘causing’ harms, which the law regularly does. People aren’t all that 
unpredictable.”); Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of 
Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 944-947 (2000) (defending reckless 
complicity against arguments of overreach).  
87 R A Duff, “Can I Help You?” Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist, 10 
LEGAL STUDIES 165–181 (1990); GLANVILLE LLEWELYN WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: 
THE GENERAL PART 368–349 (1953); FLETCHER, supra note 5, at 582–583. 
88 For just three recent books on the topic, see H. Kudlich, Die Unterstützung fremder 
Straftaten durch berufsbedingtes Verhalten (Berlin, 2004); P. Rackow, Neutrale 
Handlungen als Problem des Strafrechts (Frankfurt am Main, 2007); K. Pilz, Beihilfes 
zur Steuerhinterziehung durch neutrale Handlungen von Bankmitarbeitern (Frankfurt am 
Main et al., 2001). 
89 See James G. Stewart, The Accomplice Liability of Arms Vendors: A Conceptual 
Defense, (2014) forthcoming. 
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Kadish dubbed “non-proxyable crimes.”90 Can an accomplice who is 
herself not married be convicted of bigamy if she helps a married friend 
marry for a second time? These and the other problems set out here are 
difficult, but they are also deserving of our ongoing intellectual energies—
complicity goes to the heart of our attempts to live an honest moral life, in 
this our very imperfect world. 
 
 
                                                
90 Kadish, supra note 29, at 373; John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW 
AND PHILOS. 127–141, 127 (2007); Gideon Yaffe, Moore on Causing, Acting, and 
Complicity, 18 LEGAL THEORY 437, 451–453 (2012); VOLKER KREY, GERMAN 
CRIMINAL LAW GENERAL PART 157–159 (2002) (discussing crimes that must be 
committed with one’s own hands “eigenhändige Delikte”, crimes that can only be 
incurred by persons under a specific legal duty “Pflicht", and crimes that can only be 
committed by individuals with special qualities “Sonderdelikte”). 
